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1.
Wellcome Open Res ; 2023.
Artigo em Inglês | EuropePMC | ID: covidwho-2255340

RESUMO

Background: The ability of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines to protect against infection and onward transmission determines whether immunisation can control global circulation. We estimated the effectiveness of Pfizer-BioNTech mRNA vaccine (BNT162b2) and Oxford AstraZeneca adenovirus vector vaccine (ChAdOx1) vaccines against acquisition and transmission of the Alpha and Delta variants in a prospective household study in England. Methods: : Households were recruited based on adult purported index cases testing positive after reverse transcription-quantitative (RT-q)PCR testing of oral-nasal swabs. Purported index cases and their household contacts took oral-nasal swabs on days 1, 3 and 7 after enrolment and a subset of the PCR-positive swabs underwent genomic sequencing conducted on a subset. We used Bayesian logistic regression to infer vaccine effectiveness against acquisition and transmission, adjusted for age, vaccination history and variant. Results: : Between 2 February 2021 and 10 September 2021, 213 index cases and 312 contacts were followed up. After excluding households lacking genomic proximity (N=2) or with unlikely serial intervals (N=16), 195 households with 278 contacts remained, of whom 113 (41%) became PCR positive. Delta lineages had 1.53 times the risk (95% Credible Interval: 1.04 – 2.20) of transmission than Alpha;contacts older than 18 years old were 1.48 (1.20 – 1.91) and 1.02 (0.93 – 1.16) times more likely to acquire an Alpha or Delta infection than children. Effectiveness of two doses of BNT162b2 against transmission of Delta was 36% (-1%, 66%) and 49% (18%, 73%) for ChAdOx1, similar to their effectiveness for Alpha. Protection against infection with Alpha was higher than for Delta, 69% (9%, 95%) vs. 18% (-11%, 59%), respectively, for BNT162b2 and 24% (-41%, 72%) vs. 9% (-15%, 42%), respectively, for ChAdOx1. Conclusions: : BNT162b2 and ChAdOx1 reduce transmission of the Delta variant from breakthrough infections in the household setting, although their protection against infection within this setting is low.

3.
J Travel Med ; 29(3)2022 05 31.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1758787

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: A rapid, accurate, non-invasive diagnostic screen is needed to identify people with SARS-CoV-2 infection. We investigated whether organic semi-conducting (OSC) sensors and trained dogs could distinguish between people infected with asymptomatic or mild symptoms, and uninfected individuals, and the impact of screening at ports-of-entry. METHODS: Odour samples were collected from adults, and SARS-CoV-2 infection status confirmed using RT-PCR. OSC sensors captured the volatile organic compound (VOC) profile of odour samples. Trained dogs were tested in a double-blind trial to determine their ability to detect differences in VOCs between infected and uninfected individuals, with sensitivity and specificity as the primary outcome. Mathematical modelling was used to investigate the impact of bio-detection dogs for screening. RESULTS: About, 3921 adults were enrolled in the study and odour samples collected from 1097 SARS-CoV-2 infected and 2031 uninfected individuals. OSC sensors were able to distinguish between SARS-CoV-2 infected individuals and uninfected, with sensitivity from 98% (95% CI 95-100) to 100% and specificity from 99% (95% CI 97-100) to 100%. Six dogs were able to distinguish between samples with sensitivity ranging from 82% (95% CI 76-87) to 94% (95% CI 89-98) and specificity ranging from 76% (95% CI 70-82) to 92% (95% CI 88-96). Mathematical modelling suggests that dog screening plus a confirmatory PCR test could detect up to 89% of SARS-CoV-2 infections, averting up to 2.2 times as much transmission compared to isolation of symptomatic individuals only. CONCLUSIONS: People infected with SARS-CoV-2, with asymptomatic or mild symptoms, have a distinct odour that can be identified by sensors and trained dogs with a high degree of accuracy. Odour-based diagnostics using sensors and/or dogs may prove a rapid and effective tool for screening large numbers of people.Trial Registration NCT04509713 (clinicaltrials.gov).


Assuntos
COVID-19 , Cães , Animais , Infecções Assintomáticas , COVID-19/diagnóstico , Humanos , Programas de Rastreamento , SARS-CoV-2 , Sensibilidade e Especificidade , Compostos Orgânicos Voláteis/análise
4.
Euro Surveill ; 26(39)2021 09.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1448678

RESUMO

BackgroundTo mitigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks from international air travellers, many countries implemented a combination of up to 14 days of self-quarantine upon arrival plus PCR testing in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.AimTo assess the effectiveness of quarantine and testing of international travellers to reduce risk of onward SARS-CoV-2 transmission into a destination country in the pre-COVID-19 vaccination era.MethodsWe used a simulation model of air travellers arriving in the United Kingdom from the European Union or the United States, incorporating timing of infection stages while varying quarantine duration and timing and number of PCR tests.ResultsQuarantine upon arrival with a PCR test on day 7 plus a 1-day delay for results can reduce the number of infectious arriving travellers released into the community by a median 94% (95% uncertainty interval (UI): 89-98) compared with a no quarantine/no test scenario. This reduction is similar to that achieved by a 14-day quarantine period (median > 99%; 95% UI: 98-100). Even shorter quarantine periods can prevent a substantial amount of transmission; all strategies in which travellers spend at least 5 days (mean incubation period) in quarantine and have at least one negative test before release are highly effective (median reduction 89%; 95% UI: 83-95)).ConclusionThe effect of different screening strategies impacts asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals differently. The choice of an optimal quarantine and testing strategy for unvaccinated air travellers may vary based on the number of possible imported infections relative to domestic incidence.


Assuntos
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Vacinas contra COVID-19 , Humanos , Pandemias , Quarentena , Reino Unido/epidemiologia
5.
Lancet Public Health ; 6(3): e175-e183, 2021 03.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1164723

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: In most countries, contacts of confirmed COVID-19 cases are asked to quarantine for 14 days after exposure to limit asymptomatic onward transmission. While theoretically effective, this policy places a substantial social and economic burden on both the individual and wider society, which might result in low adherence and reduced policy effectiveness. We aimed to assess the merit of testing contacts to avert onward transmission and to replace or reduce the length of quarantine for uninfected contacts. METHODS: We used an agent-based model to simulate the viral load dynamics of exposed contacts, and their potential for onward transmission in different quarantine and testing strategies. We compared the performance of quarantines of differing durations, testing with either PCR or lateral flow antigen (LFA) tests at the end of quarantine, and daily LFA testing without quarantine, against the current 14-day quarantine strategy. We also investigated the effect of contact tracing delays and adherence to both quarantine and self-isolation on the effectiveness of each strategy. FINDINGS: Assuming moderate levels of adherence to quarantine and self-isolation, self-isolation on symptom onset alone can prevent 37% (95% uncertainty interval [UI] 12-56) of onward transmission potential from secondary cases. 14 days of post-exposure quarantine reduces transmission by 59% (95% UI 28-79). Quarantine with release after a negative PCR test 7 days after exposure might avert a similar proportion (54%, 95% UI 31-81; risk ratio [RR] 0·94, 95% UI 0·62-1·24) to that of the 14-day quarantine period, as would quarantine with a negative LFA test 7 days after exposure (50%, 95% UI 28-77; RR 0·88, 0·66-1·11) or daily testing without quarantine for 5 days after tracing (50%, 95% UI 23-81; RR 0·88, 0·60-1·43) if all tests are returned negative. A stronger effect might be possible if individuals isolate more strictly after a positive test and if contacts can be notified faster. INTERPRETATION: Testing might allow for a substantial reduction in the length of, or replacement of, quarantine with a small excess in transmission risk. Decreasing test and trace delays and increasing adherence will further increase the effectiveness of these strategies. Further research is required to empirically evaluate the potential costs (increased transmission risk, false reassurance) and benefits (reduction in the burden of quarantine, increased adherence) of such strategies before adoption as policy. FUNDING: National Institute for Health Research, UK Research and Innovation, Wellcome Trust, EU Horizon 2021, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.


Assuntos
Teste para COVID-19/métodos , COVID-19/prevenção & controle , Busca de Comunicante , Quarentena , COVID-19/epidemiologia , Humanos , Modelos Teóricos
6.
BMC Med ; 18(1): 270, 2020 09 03.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-742409

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: The COVID-19 pandemic has placed an unprecedented strain on health systems, with rapidly increasing demand for healthcare in hospitals and intensive care units (ICUs) worldwide. As the pandemic escalates, determining the resulting needs for healthcare resources (beds, staff, equipment) has become a key priority for many countries. Projecting future demand requires estimates of how long patients with COVID-19 need different levels of hospital care. METHODS: We performed a systematic review of early evidence on length of stay (LoS) of patients with COVID-19 in hospital and in ICU. We subsequently developed a method to generate LoS distributions which combines summary statistics reported in multiple studies, accounting for differences in sample sizes. Applying this approach, we provide distributions for total hospital and ICU LoS from studies in China and elsewhere, for use by the community. RESULTS: We identified 52 studies, the majority from China (46/52). Median hospital LoS ranged from 4 to 53 days within China, and 4 to 21 days outside of China, across 45 studies. ICU LoS was reported by eight studies-four each within and outside China-with median values ranging from 6 to 12 and 4 to 19 days, respectively. Our summary distributions have a median hospital LoS of 14 (IQR 10-19) days for China, compared with 5 (IQR 3-9) days outside of China. For ICU, the summary distributions are more similar (median (IQR) of 8 (5-13) days for China and 7 (4-11) days outside of China). There was a visible difference by discharge status, with patients who were discharged alive having longer LoS than those who died during their admission, but no trend associated with study date. CONCLUSION: Patients with COVID-19 in China appeared to remain in hospital for longer than elsewhere. This may be explained by differences in criteria for admission and discharge between countries, and different timing within the pandemic. In the absence of local data, the combined summary LoS distributions provided here can be used to model bed demands for contingency planning and then updated, with the novel method presented here, as more studies with aggregated statistics emerge outside China.


Assuntos
Infecções por Coronavirus , Alocação de Recursos para a Atenção à Saúde , Tempo de Internação , Pandemias/estatística & dados numéricos , Pneumonia Viral , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Infecções por Coronavirus/epidemiologia , Infecções por Coronavirus/terapia , Alocação de Recursos para a Atenção à Saúde/métodos , Alocação de Recursos para a Atenção à Saúde/tendências , Número de Leitos em Hospital , Hospitalização/estatística & dados numéricos , Humanos , Unidades de Terapia Intensiva/estatística & dados numéricos , Tempo de Internação/estatística & dados numéricos , Tempo de Internação/tendências , Pneumonia Viral/epidemiologia , Pneumonia Viral/terapia , SARS-CoV-2
7.
BMC Med ; 18(1): 259, 2020 08 19.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-721300

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: To contain the spread of COVID-19, a cordon sanitaire was put in place in Wuhan prior to the Lunar New Year, on 23 January 2020. We assess the efficacy of the cordon sanitaire to delay the introduction and onset of local transmission of COVID-19 in other major cities in mainland China. METHODS: We estimated the number of infected travellers from Wuhan to other major cities in mainland China from November 2019 to February 2020 using previously estimated COVID-19 prevalence in Wuhan and publicly available mobility data. We focused on Beijing, Chongqing, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen as four representative major cities to identify the potential independent contribution of the cordon sanitaire and holiday travel. To do this, we simulated outbreaks generated by infected arrivals in these destination cities using stochastic branching processes. We also modelled the effect of the cordon sanitaire in combination with reduced transmissibility scenarios to simulate the effect of local non-pharmaceutical interventions. RESULTS: We find that in the four cities, given the potentially high prevalence of COVID-19 in Wuhan between December 2019 and early January 2020, local transmission may have been seeded as early as 1-8 January 2020. By the time the cordon sanitaire was imposed, infections were likely in the thousands. The cordon sanitaire alone did not substantially affect the epidemic progression in these cities, although it may have had some effect in smaller cities. Reduced transmissibility resulted in a notable decrease in the incidence of infection in the four studied cities. CONCLUSIONS: Our results indicate that sustained transmission was likely occurring several weeks prior to the implementation of the cordon sanitaire in four major cities of mainland China and that the observed decrease in incidence was likely attributable to other non-pharmaceutical, transmission-reducing interventions.


Assuntos
Betacoronavirus , Infecções por Coronavirus/prevenção & controle , Política de Saúde , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Pneumonia Viral/prevenção & controle , Viagem , COVID-19 , China/epidemiologia , Cidades , Infecções por Coronavirus/epidemiologia , Infecções por Coronavirus/transmissão , Humanos , Incidência , Modelos Teóricos , Pneumonia Viral/epidemiologia , Pneumonia Viral/transmissão , Prevalência , SARS-CoV-2
8.
J Travel Med ; 27(5)2020 08 20.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-209793

RESUMO

BACKGROUND: We evaluated if interventions aimed at air travellers can delay local severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) community transmission in a previously unaffected country. METHODS: We simulated infected air travellers arriving into countries with no sustained SARS-CoV-2 transmission or other introduction routes from affected regions. We assessed the effectiveness of syndromic screening at departure and/or arrival and traveller sensitisation to the COVID-2019-like symptoms with the aim to trigger rapid self-isolation and reporting on symptom onset to enable contact tracing. We assumed that syndromic screening would reduce the number of infected arrivals and that traveller sensitisation reduces the average number of secondary cases. We use stochastic simulations to account for uncertainty in both arrival and secondary infections rates, and present sensitivity analyses on arrival rates of infected travellers and the effectiveness of traveller sensitisation. We report the median expected delay achievable in each scenario and an inner 50% interval. RESULTS: Under baseline assumptions, introducing exit and entry screening in combination with traveller sensitisation can delay a local SARS-CoV-2 outbreak by 8 days (50% interval: 3-14 days) when the rate of importation is 1 infected traveller per week at time of introduction. The additional benefit of entry screening is small if exit screening is effective: the combination of only exit screening and traveller sensitisation can delay an outbreak by 7 days (50% interval: 2-13 days). In the absence of screening, with less effective sensitisation, or a higher rate of importation, these delays shrink rapidly to <4 days. CONCLUSION: Syndromic screening and traveller sensitisation in combination may have marginally delayed SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in unaffected countries.


Assuntos
Viagem Aérea , Infecções por Coronavirus/prevenção & controle , Programas de Rastreamento/normas , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Pneumonia Viral/prevenção & controle , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Infecções por Coronavirus/transmissão , Humanos , Pneumonia Viral/transmissão , SARS-CoV-2 , Fatores de Tempo
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